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Advancing an Understanding of Design Cognition and Design Metacognition:  







In this article we review progress that has been made in advancing a theoretical 
understanding of design cognition and design metacognition. We identify a high level of 
consistency in empirical findings, including good evidence for core design strategies such as 
conjecture-based problem formulation, problem–solution co-evolution, analogical reasoning, 
mental simulation and fixated solution generation. A further consistent theme to emerge in 
our review concerns the central role played by metacognitive monitoring and control 
processes in ensuring the effective deployment of design strategies in response to designers’ 
fluctuating feelings of uncertainty. We argue that a metacognitive perspective on design 
cognition is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of strategic processing in 
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Advancing an Understanding of Design Cognition and Design Metacognition:  
Progress and Prospects 
 
The ambition to develop design as a discipline originated in the 1960s (see Cross, 1993, 
2007, 2018), strongly fuelled by the desire of cognitive scientists (e.g., Simon, 1969) to 
establish ‘a science of design’ using empirical evidence and formal theorising to model 
problem solving in this important area of real-world endeavour. Since the 1960s the 
commitment to advance a scientific understanding of design from a cognitive perspective has 
continued apace, with a core focus on examining how information is manipulated by 
reasoning processes to generate new solution ideas, judgments and decisions. We present 
here a review of the extant research on design cognition, albeit a review that is restricted to 
what we believe are key phenomena given the sheer abundance of research that has taken 
place on this topic to date. Another factor driving our selective coverage of the literature 
concerns our desire to focus primarily on findings that have been replicated across different 
studies. As noted by Cash (2018), much design research suffers from weak methodological 
and theoretical rigour, including a lack of adequate controls, leading to inconsistent results 
and an inability to derive clear-cut causal interpretations. We finally note that in reviewing 
the literature we adopt a domain-independent view of design, extracting findings relating to 
design cognition that appear to generalise across different design fields. As such, we are not 
so concerned about any nuances of cognitive processing that seem to be specific to particular 
design areas.  
 
The research that we review has primarily used two methodologies to address the nature of 
design cognition (for examples of both approaches see Cross, Christiaans, & Dorst, 1996; for 
more detail concerning these methods see Christensen & Ball, 2014). One key method 
involves asking lone designers to ‘think-aloud’ whilst engaged in design work. This gives rise 
to a verbal protocol that can be transcribed, coded and analysed to reveal aspects of thinking 
and reasoning. Another important method involves the researcher monitoring team-based 
design conversations, with the resulting transcripts again being coded and analysed to elicit 
an understanding of the socio-cognitive dimensions of team-based design thinking. A more 
limited subset of the research we review has used experimental methods, involving random 
allocation of designers to different conditions to determine the causal impact of manipulated 
variables on performance outcomes (e.g., creative ideation or design quality).  
 
In summarising important findings regarding design cognition, we aim to demonstrate that a 
major concern is to understand how designers select and deploy design strategies to navigate 
through the inherent ‘uncertainty’ that pervades real-world design problems because of their 
‘ill-defined’ (Simon, 1973) or ‘wicked’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973) nature. We will show that 
designers’ abilities to steer a path through such uncertainty by careful strategy selection 
enables them to progress effectively from an ill-defined design problem to an end-point of 
having a high-quality design solution. We contend, moreover, that in striving to understand 
strategic processing in design, researchers are fundamentally concerned not just with design 
cognition but also with design ‘metacognition’. Metacognition refers to processes that 
continually monitor and control cognition so that effective strategies can be maintained whilst 
ineffective ones can be abandoned and replaced (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017, 2018). In 
our view, metacognition is an overlooked aspect of cognitive processing in design, despite 
being central to deriving a full understanding of every aspect of designers’ ongoing activity in 
attaining an implementable design solution. In concluding our review, we argue that viewing 
design cognition through a metacognitive lens can enable an integrated understanding to be 
derived of the way in which strategies change over the timecourse of a design task in 
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response to designers’ fluctuating feelings of uncertainty. We also suggest that bringing the 
concept of design metacognition to centre stage offers many fresh ideas for future design 
research. 
 
1 Problem formulation processes in design  
 
Design is not simply a case of ‘business-as-usual’ problem solving given the typically 
extensive information concerning requirements and constraints that is either loosely specified 
in the design brief or is simply absent altogether, making design problems some of the most 
ill-defined tasks tackled in professional contexts. What this means in practice is that designers 
must, of necessity, spend some initial time reflecting on what the problem is – a process that 
Cross (2001) captures neatly with the term ‘problem formulation’, whereby some initial 
assumptions are made about requirements and constraints. As Ullman, Dietterich, and 
Stauffer (1988) observed in studies of expert designers in mechanical engineering, numerous 
constraints are introduced early based on domain knowledge, whilst others are derived during 
the problem-solving process as designers explore solution concepts.  
 
Notwithstanding the evidence that at least some initial problem formulation needs to take 
place in design, what has also been consistently seen in studies of expert designers is that this 
process in invariably incomplete, fluid and time-limited, with designers often being more 
interested in jumping toward the exploration of ideas for potential solutions rather than trying 
to formulate all aspects of the problem up-front (e.g., Eastman, 1970; Lawson, 1979; Lloyd & 
Scott, 1994). What is fascinating, too, is that experienced designers are so adept at handling 
problem formulation in a fluid and partial way that they will do this even when design 
problems are relatively well defined. In other words, experienced designers still treat well-
defined design problems as if they are ill-defined, relaxing or redefining constraints and 
amending or augmenting goals (e.g., Akin, 1978; Thomas & Carroll, 1979), seemingly being 
averse to engaging in business-as-usual problem solving even when it is possible. 
 
1.1 Individual differences in problem formulation 
 
Other studies examining problem formulation in design have focused on individual variation 
in strategies, including differences between expert and novice designers. For example, 
Christiaans and Dorst (1992) observed that junior design students tended not to gather much 
information about the given problem, instead solving what was essentially a simpler problem 
because of a lack of awareness of key constraints and difficulties. In contrast, Christiaans and 
Dorst found that senior design students could be sub-divided into two types: (i) those who 
tended to get enmeshed in extensive, initial information gathering to the detriment of 
progressing to solution generation, which severely limited success; and (ii) those who tended 
to gather less initial information and were more successful in generating good-quality 
solutions. In a subsequent study of engineering design students, Atman, Chimka, Bursic, and 
Nachtmann (1999) investigated the problem solving of freshmen with little design experience 
and senior students with more advanced design experience. Freshmen who spent a large 
proportion of time formulating the problem (what Atman et al., referred to as ‘problem 
scoping’) produced poor designs compared to freshmen who spent less time on this activity, 
with the former seemingly becoming stuck trying to define the problem (cf. Christiaans & 
Dorst, 1992). The seniors not only engaged more extensively in problem scoping than the 
freshmen, but this information-gathering and assumption-making was more successful, 
leading to better design solutions. 
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In sum, there is clear evidence for individual differences in problem formulation, with 
successful designers being those who spend sufficient yet effective time gathering initial 
information and defining goals and constraints rather than spending excessive time on such 
activities that is unproductive for problem-solving progress. Such strategic differences in 
problem formulation seem to be linked to designers’ experience, being acquired as a designer 
becomes adept at understanding how best to balance problem formulation and solution 
development to achieve successful design outcomes. What is less clear is the nature of the 
moment-by-moment metacognitive monitoring and control processes that drive decisions to 
continue with problem formulation or to switch to solution development, which represents a 
fruitful avenue for research. 
 
1.2 Solution conjectures and problem framing 
 
Studies of individual differences in problem formulation suggest that whilst some degree of 
problem-definition activity is critical for design success it is equally important that activity 
progresses quickly toward solution generation. Indeed, there is good evidence that 
speculative solution ideas are themselves very useful for helping to formulate design 
problems, with such ideas effectively serving as ‘conjectures’ that allow designers to clarify 
their understanding of the problem. For example, Darke (1979), in her studies of renowned 
architects, showed that they generated initial solution concepts as ‘primary generators’, which 
acted as guiding conjectures to provide ‘a way into the problem’, whilst also enabling the 
architects to explore and understand the problem by testing the adequacy of an initial solution 
concept (see Lloyd & Scott, 1995, for similar observations in the architectural domain, which 
they refer to as the generation of ‘problem paradigms’).  
 
A solution-oriented, conjectural approach to designing makes good sense, as having a 
solution idea in mind allows the designer to check whether it meets problem requirements 
and constraints. This process will invariably reveal that certain information is missing or 
poorly articulated such the client can be consulted for clarification or else feasible 
assumptions can be made. The view that design revolves around the generation of solution 
conjectures also resonates with the notion that creative idea generation in design in primarily 
driven by ‘abductive reasoning’ (e.g., Cramer-Petersen, Christensen, & Ahmed-Kristensen, 
2019; Dong, Lovallo, & Mounarath, 2015; Dorst, 2011; Roozenburg, 1993), which is defined 
as ‘inference to the best explanation’ (e.g., Schurz, 2008) because the goal is to provide a 
suitable conjecture to account for available data. The link between abductive reasoning and 
creative design should be apparent, as the latter activity fundamentally involves generating an 
effective solution conjecture to meet requirements and constraints.  
 
Darke’s (1979) concept of a primary generator that acts as guiding conjecture to enable 
design advancement also aligns closely with Schön’s (1983) concept of a problem ‘frame’. 
According to Schön, an expert designer, having selected features of a problem to attend to (a 
process referred to as ‘naming’) will then identify aspects of the solution they wish to explore 
and develop (a process described as ‘framing’). Schön (1983) also clarified that such framing 
is rarely conducted in a single burst of activity at the start of design work, but instead occurs 
throughout the design process, as confirmed in many subsequent studies (e.g., Adams, 
Aleong, Goldstein, & Solis, 2018; Goel & Pirolli, 1992; Valkenburg & Dorst, 1998). In their 
study of team design, for example, Valkenburg and Dorst (1998) identified five different 
frames that were used sequentially by a successful industrial design team tackling a given 
project. In contrast, the unsuccessful team relied on a single frame and spent a much greater 
proportion of time understanding the problem rather than developing solution concepts.  
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As McDonnell (2018) notes, a key benefit of a problem frame as conceptualised by Schön 
(1983) is that it enables designers to impose order and coherence on a complex, uncertain and 
unstable design situation so that good design decisions can be made. In this way, effective 
framing enforces what McDonnell refers to as a ‘discipline’, by inviting and supporting 
certain design moves and ruling out others. The success of design work will, therefore, be 
crucially dependent on the designer’s effective operationalisation of a frame that provides 
sufficient room for creative exploration whilst also providing sufficient constraints to enable 
a focused solution to progress. McDonnell (2018) discusses a case study whereby a lack of 
‘frame discipline’ led to impoverished design work, whilst Lloyd and Oak (2018) provide 
evidence for how a clearly articulated and systematically co-developed problem frame can 
enable a design team to structure and anchor collaborative activity to achieve productive 
design development.  
 
1.3 Problem–solution co-evolution  
 
The role played by solution-focused conjectures in facilitating designers to interrogate and 
understand design problems underscores the way in which design problems are dynamic and 
mutable and can continually be informed by emerging solution ideas throughout the 
timecourse of design. This close interplay between problem formulation and solution 
generation has led to the theoretical proposal that designing should be viewed as a process of 
‘problem–solution co-evolution’, whereby the designer explores two conceptual spaces, a 
‘problem space’ and a ‘solution space’, with each informing the other (e.g., Cross & Dorst, 
1998; Dorst & Cross, 2001). This co-evolution view of design was originally espoused by 
Maher (e.g., Maher, 1994, 2000; Maher & Poon, 1995, 1996; Poon & Maher, 1997), who 
drew on the biological concept of two species interacting so closely that their evolutionary 
fitness is co-dependent. By evoking this metaphor from nature, Maher advanced a 
computational understanding of how design problems and solutions can be modelled as 
evolving separately whilst having a mutual effect on one another (see Dorst, 2019, for 
contemporary considerations relating to modelling co-evolution).  
 
The concept of problem–solution co-evolution in design gained further traction following 
Dorst and Cross’s (2001) study that analysed verbal-protocol data from nine experienced 
industrial designers working individually to create a litter-disposal system for adoption in a 
new Netherlands train. This investigation revealed that designers simultaneously refined both 
their problem formulation and their solution ideas through a process of analysis, synthesis 
and evaluation that iterated between the problem space and the solution space. Furthermore, 
creative ideation did not arise in the form of a ‘creative leap’ from the problem to the 
solution, but instead involved the building of a ‘bridge’ between the problem space and the 
solution space (see Cross, 1997, for prior, related findings). The construction of such bridges 
appeared to be triggered by the designer’s identification of ‘surprising’ or ‘interesting’ 
information in the design brief or associated documents. In this respect Dorst and Cross draw 
an important conceptual link to Schön’s (1983) notion of problem framing by proposing that 
a creative event arises when a problem–solution pairing is ‘framed’. Dorst and Cross 
additionally contend that studies of outstanding designers (e.g., Cross & Clayburn Cross, 
1998) confirm that problem–solution framing ability is critical for designers’ attainment of 
the very highest levels of performance in creative design.  
 
Maher and Tang (2003) also presented empirical evidence for problem–solution co-evolution, 
reporting one study in which senior student designers thought aloud whilst designing a novel 
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product and another study involving experienced architects being tasked with designing a 
house, who described their thought processes retrospectively. These studies revealed that co-
evolution transitions often manifested as temporal oscillations between problem requirements 
and solutions until satisfactory solutions were identified. Despite the appeal of the problem–
solution co-evolution concept in design-cognition research, Wiltschnig, Christensen, and Ball 
(2013) noted that the studies reported by Maher and Tang (2003) and Dorst and Cross (2001) 
suffer from a potential lack of ecological validity as they involved laboratory observations of 
time-limited design activities with individual designers. In response to these concerns, 
Wiltschnig et al. conducted a study of team-based design in a professional design context 
where the task spanned 2 years and involved 19 expert engineering designers organised into 
smaller sub-groups focusing on design sub-problems. The results established the generality of 
problem–solution co-evolution in naturally-occurring design collaboration, with 12% of 
design activity being structured around co-evolution episodes. In addition, Wiltschnig et al. 
corroborated the prediction that co-evolution involves various directional transitions between 
problem and solution spaces. Although co-evolution was dominated by requirements analysis 
leading to solution attempts (73% of episodes) there were also numerous instances of solution 
attempts sparking requirements analysis (19% of episodes), which often resulted in 
requirement changes. This evidence attests to the bi-directional nature of co-evolution in real-
world design and its capacity to modify aspects of the problem space through processes 
whereby requirements are reinterpreted, altered, deleted or added.  
 
Wiltschnig et al.’s (2013) study additionally revealed the extent to which co-evolution arises 
from interactive processing between two or more members of the design team. Their analysis 
showed that 67% of co-evolution episodes were collaborative, with designers feeding off one 
another’s proposals when formulating problems and generating solution possibilities. The 
team leader also played a vital role in catalysing co-evolution episodes, which resonates with 
Ball and Ormerod’s (2000) observation that team managers deploy a range of tactics to 
ensure effective problem formulation and design development. Such tactics appear to reflect 
the high degree of metacognitive awareness of expert team managers regarding how to 
motivate and control ongoing design to achieve successful problem formulations and solution 
outcomes. 
 
2 Solution generation and solution evaluation processes in design 
 
Our foregoing examination of problem-formulation processes in design revealed how the ill-
defined nature of design problems necessitates a highly solution-focused design approach, 
with solution ideas acting as conjectures that inform a deeper understanding of the problem 
whilst also serving to frame ongoing activity. The complex, ill-defined nature of design 
problems also means that design activity rarely involves an attempt to find an ‘optimal’ 
solution, as the investment of time and effort would be prohibitive. In addition, it is unlikely 
that a designer would even know if an optimal solution had been achieved given that 
requirements and constraints are so malleable. Such logistic considerations mean that 
designers are more likely to develop satisfactory solutions rather than optimal ones – a notion 
neatly captured by Simon’s (e.g., 1969) concept of ‘satisficing’. When implemented 
effectively, satisficing reflects a strategic balancing act that involves a problem solver 
engaging in adequate search and exploration of alternative solution ideas to identify one that 
is better than its competitors without spending too much time engaged in such exploration, 
otherwise productive activity could falter. To what extent does design involve a satisficing 
approach? We look at this issue in more detail below by reviewing evidence relating to 
solution generation and evaluation processes in design. 
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2.1 Attachment to early ideas and limited consideration of alternative solution concepts 
 
The value of a satisficing approach to design (Simon, 1969) is that it ensures that a ‘good 
enough’ solution concept is identified from a range of alternatives. Evidence suggests, 
however, that designers often focus on ‘single’ solution ideas and fail to consider and 
evaluate alternative options (see Ball, Lambell, Reed, & Reid, 2001, for a review of early 
research on this issue). This limited consideration of alternatives arises from the very outset 
of design activity, with designers showing early attachment to initial solution ideas –  
whether these are thought of as conjectures, primary generators, frames or paradigms. One 
pioneering study by Kant (1985) revealed that expert algorithm designers rapidly developed a 
single ‘kernel’ idea that was progressively refined through levels of increasing detail. Similar 
evidence for an attachment to initial design ideas and a lack of exploration of alternative 
concepts has been reported in software engineering (e.g., Adelson & Soloway 1986; Guindon 
1990; Jeffries, Turner, Polson, & Atwood 1981), mechanical engineering (e.g., Ullman et 
al.,1988), architecture (e.g., Rowe, 1987) and electronic engineering (e.g., Ball, Evans, & 
Dennis 1994; Ball, Maskill, & Ormerod 1998). These studies cut across different design 
domains and transcend different problem types and levels of expertise, suggesting that the 
limited generation of alternative solution ideas is a generic feature of designers’ natural 
practices.  
 
As mentioned by Cross (2001), however, it could be that good designers either: (i)  
produce adequate concepts from the outset such that these do not need to be altered radically 
during subsequent design development; or (ii) are adept at modifying concepts to ensure that 
they are satisfactory even if weaknesses arise during subsequent development. There is 
credibility to both possibilities, especially in the case of highly expert designers, who are 
likely to have good solution ideas as well as the experience and skills to enhance these even if 
weaknesses become evident. Indeed, a recent study by Kazakci, Gillier, Piat, and Hatchuel 
(2014) revealed that when solving real-life design tasks, those professional design teams that 
generated fewer initial ideas also generated better final design solutions. That said, there is 
also evidence that even experienced designers can be reluctant to give up design ideas when 
they are a long way off from being satisfactory. For example, Ullman et al. (1988; Ullman, 
Stauffer, & Dietterich, 1987) observed that expert designers would ‘patch’ weak designs 
rather than discard them to pursue new concepts. As they note, “The first idea was almost 
sacred, and sometimes even highly implausible patches would be applied to make it work” 
(Ullman et al., 1987, p. 16). Similarly, in team-innovation contexts individuals show an over-
zealous preference (i.e., ‘ownership bias’) for their own ideas over the potentially better ideas 
of others (Onarheim & Christensen, 2012). 
 
Evidence from Fricke (1996, 1999) suggests that the tendency for designers to generate 
alternative concepts may be modulated by the degree of precision present in the given design 
problem. When the design problem was specified with high precision then designers 
generated more solution alternatives than when the design problem for the same task was 
imprecise. This evidence is fascinating from the perspective of metacognitive monitoring and 
control as it suggests that designers readily modulate their solution-generation activity to 
meet the demands of the problem; the more active development of a single, fixed concept for 
an imprecise problem gives rise to a problem frame that focuses subsequent activity, whereas 
precisely defined problems facilitate exploration of alternative ideas to identify a preferred 
solution. 
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2.2 Solution fixation and solution inspiration 
 
Another form of limited solution exploration in design concerns the phenomenon of 
‘fixation’, whereby example solution concepts constrain a designer’s imagination. The classic 
demonstration of design fixation was reported by Jansson and Smith (1991), who conducted a 
laboratory-based study in which senior design students and professional designers produced 
solutions for written design briefs. A subset of the participants also received pictures of 
existing solutions alongside these briefs. These latter designers repeated many more features 
of the exemplar solutions in their own designs than did those who only received the written 
briefs, even when these features undermined solution success. Since Jansson and Smith’s 
(1991) original demonstration of design fixation, numerous studies have used a similar 
experimental paradigm to replicate the effect and explore the conditions influencing its 
emergence, for example, through manipulations of properties of presented examples (e.g., 
their richness, uncommonness or modality) and differences in design expertise (see Crilly, 
2019b, for a state-of-the-art review).  
 
Another line of research related to studies of design fixation has examined how presented 
examples may serve as ‘analogies’ to inspire creative idea generation in design (e.g., Casakin 
& Goldschmidt, 1999; Goel, 1997; Helms, Vattam, & Goel, 2009). The examples used in 
‘design-by-analogy’ studies are potentially beneficial, which is a different approach to that 
sometimes taken in design-fixation research, where examples may not meet task 
requirements. Design-by-analogy studies also typically present examples that are uncommon 
and remote from the target design domain (e.g., the analogies may be from biology whilst the 
target domain is engineering; e.g., Yargin, Firth, & Crilly, 2018). Furthermore, various 
procedural factors are manipulated in design-by-analogy studies, such as the number of 
examples and the timing of presentation (i.e., before vs. during problem solving). 
 
Studies examining design fixation and design-by-analogy have revealed inconsistent findings 
regarding the fixating versus inspiring effects of examples – a conclusion also drawn by 
Vasconcelos and Crilly (2016), whose review of 25 studies revealed how the use of diverse 
methods has engendered equally diverse findings (cf. Crilly, 2019b). However, Sio, 
Kotovsky, and Cagan (2015) reported a systematic meta-analysis of 43 studies of design 
fixation and design-by-analogy that revealed some regularities in observed effects, including 
evidence that providing examples triggers more example-related ideas and fewer categories 
of ideas, but with ideas also having greater ‘novelty’. There was also a positive correlation 
between the quality of generated ideas and the degree of borrowing from the examples. 
Moreover, the facilitatory effect of examples on novelty and quality increased with the 
presentation of fewer and less common prior examples. Interestingly, there was no correlation 
between the quantity and quality of solution ideas, again challenging the view that generating 
more ideas increases the chance of a good solution. Sio et al. (2015) additionally identified a 
significant ‘timing’ effect, whereby presenting examples at the beginning of design rather 
than during design produced a larger positive impact on solutions, which is consistent with 
the observation that after a period of initial design work designers are reluctant to discard an 
idea they are committed to. This timing effect is opposite to that reported by Moss, Kotovsky, 
and Cagan (2007, 2011), which indicated that cues were more effective when presented after 
initial design work than beforehand. Other research by Tseng, Moss, Cagan, and Kotovsky 
(2008), however, has suggested that only examples from ‘far’ domains and not ‘near’ ones 
are beneficial when presented after initial work, with the reverse being the case for examples 
presented at the beginning of the design task.  
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Sio et al.’s (2015) meta-analytic findings speak more to the inspiring effects of examples for 
design success than their negative, fixating effects. Indeed, it seems that presenting a single, 
uncommon example may encourage designers to engage in a metacognitive shift from 
traversing between different parts of the problem space to conducting a deeper search in a 
specific, remote domain, facilitating the generation of high-quality, novel ideas. As a caveat, 
however, we note that Sio et al. (2015) restricted their sample to a subset of experiments, 
such that their analysis might be statistically underpowered with respect to the range of 
fixation effects considered, rendering their observations in need of validation. Sio et al. also 
only included studies involving ‘non-negative examples’ that did not breach requirements for 
target design problems, which may further limit their conclusions. Notwithstanding these 
issues, however, Sio et al.’s findings resonate with observations arising in Alipour, Faizi, 
Moradi, and Akrami’s (2017) integrative review of 50 studies of fixation and inspiration 
effects in design, which likewise indicated that uncommon examples that are an appropriate 
distance from the target design problem can to mitigate fixation effects. 
 
In considering fixation and inspiration in design we finally note Crilly’s (2019a) concern that 
reviews focusing on experimental studies of these effects typically fail to attend to real-world 
design practices. This is an important point as one may expect to find key differences 
between design ‘in the lab’ versus design ‘in the wild (Ball & Christensen, 2018; Cash, 
Hicks, & Culley, 2013). We therefore repeat Crilly’s call for more systematic case studies of 
fixation and inspiration in real-world projects and we welcome Crilly and Firth’s (2019) 
presentation of three ‘best practice’ case studies that reveal how fixation and ‘defixation’ 
should be viewed as ongoing processes rather than momentary events (e.g., an idea that is 
being fixated might have represented a ‘breakthrough’ at an earlier point). 
 
2.3 Self-generated analogies and creative idea generation 
 
In contrast to research examining how examples and analogies influence design creativity, 
another literature instead focuses on the role of spontaneous analogising in design, where 
analogies are self-generated by designers. Studies of real-world design by Visser (1996a, 
1996b) and Ball, Ormerod, and Morley (2004) demonstrated that self-generated analogies are 
an important feature of innovative design. Christensen and Schunn’s (2007) ‘in vivo’ 
examination of team discussions in a company specialising in the design of medical plastics 
again found analogising to be a frequent strategy, with analogies serving three primary 
functions: problem identification, problem solving and explaining. When analogies were 
coded for their ‘distance’ from medical plastics, within-domain (or ‘near’) analogies 
prevailed during problem identification, whereas between-domain (or ‘far’) analogies 
prevailed during explanation. Solution generation was characterised by an equal distribution 
of within-domain and between-domain analogies. 
 
In follow-up work in engineering design, Ball and Christensen (2009) identified that most 
spontaneously generated analogies were between-domain, indicating their value for 
innovative idea generation in a highly creative design project. Analogies were evenly 
distributed across solution generation, explanation and ‘function finding’ (i.e., searching for 
novel functions for the design concept), with just a few arising for problem understanding. 
The most striking finding, however, was that analogising was closely associated with 
conditions of subjective uncertainty, as indexed by designers’ use of ‘hedge words’ (e.g., 
maybe, perhaps, not sure). A temporal analysis of analogising episodes in relation to 
expressions of uncertainty clarified that analogising reduced uncertainty back to baseline 
values. Ball and Christensen concluded that analogising is a design strategy under 
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metacognitive control, which is triggered by feelings of uncertainty regarding how to 
progress a design solution. Once deployed, analogising serves to support the continuity of 
design activity whilst also reducing subjective uncertainty. Chan, Paletz, and Schunn (2012) 
confirmed Ball and Christensen’s (2009) observations regarding the close temporal coupling 
between subjective uncertainty and analogising, albeit in the domain of scientific problem 
solving. They used a time-lagged logistic regression approach to reveal that uncertainty 
increases prior to analogising, maintains an elevated level during analogising and returns to a 
baseline level just after analogising.  
 
In other research, Casakin, Ball, Christensen, and Badke-Schaub (2015) showed that 
analogising in team-based design not only ensures progress, but additionally fulfils a social 
function by engendering enhanced team cohesion and improved collaboration. In another 
recent study, Christensen and Ball (2016) examined how designers’ unique domain 
knowledge can fuel analogy-based creativity in heterogeneous teams where members had 
disparate educational backgrounds relating to different design domains. The analysis revealed 
that analogies that ‘matched’ (rather than ‘mismatched’) the educational backgrounds of team 
members were generated and revisited more frequently, presumably because they were more 
accessible. Matching analogies were also associated with increased uncertainty, perhaps 
because domain experts appreciated the challenges involved in mapping such analogies to the 
current task. Christensen and Ball (2016) concluded that diverse knowledge in teams is 
beneficial for novel idea generation, which is often mediated through the production of 
analogies (cf. Menold & Jablokow’s, 2019, evidence that ‘cognitive style diversity’ in teams 
can positively impact design quality). Self-generated analogies also appear to have important 
associations with problem–solution co-evolution in design teams. This was evident in 
Wiltschnig et al.’s (2013) study, which revealed that co-evolution episodes were more likely 
to arise contemporaneous with creative analogising, with a predicted link also observed 
between co-evolution, analogising and expressions of uncertainty. Analogising was seen to 
be especially dominant in co-evolution episodes pertaining to solution generation, attesting to 
the key role of analogising in creative ideation in situations of uncertainty.  
 
2.4 Mental simulation and idea evaluation 
 
‘Mental simulation’ is another design strategy that is critical for evaluating the viability of 
emerging creative ideas (Ball & Christensen, 2009). In this strategy a sequence of inter-
dependent events is consciously enacted or ‘run’ in a dynamic mental model to determine 
cause-effect relationships and predict likely outcomes (Nersessian, 2002). The mental models 
that underpin mental simulation involve qualitative rather than quantitative reasoning, such 
that mental simulation provides a quick and economical way for a designer to test a 
developing idea, including how a design component might function under changed 
circumstances or with altered features. Mental simulation can also extend to imagining the 
way in which end-users might interact with an artefact or system.  
 
In their study of medical product design, Christensen and Schunn (2009) identified instances 
of mental simulation to test three assumptions, namely, that mental simulations: (i) are run in 
situations associated with subjective uncertainty; (ii) inform reality through inferences that 
reduce uncertainty; and (iii) have a role that is approximate and inexact. They provided 
support for all three assumptions: initial representations in simulations had higher than 
baseline levels of uncertainty; uncertainty was reduced after the simulation run; and resulting 
representations contained more approximate references than either baseline data or initial 
representations. These findings were replicated in Ball and Christensen’s (2009) study of 
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innovative, team-based product design and in Ball, Onarheim, and Christensen’s (2010) study 
of collaborative software design. Both studies strengthened evidence for the claim that mental 
simulation, like analogical reasoning, is a strategy triggered by metacognitive feelings of 
uncertainty that serves to progress design activity (especially the evaluation of potential 
design ideas) whilst also reducing uncertainty. Indeed, Ball et al.’s (2010) study provided 
evidence that mental simulation was particularly prevalent for solution ideas generated in 
response to the highest-complexity (i.e., most uncertain) requirements. 
 
3 The global organisation of cognitive processes in design 
 
We have considered various aspects of the organisation of cognitive processes in design, such 
as the way that design often involves an iterative process of problem–solution co-evolution. 
In addition, we have examined how subjective uncertainty appears to trigger metacognitive 
control processes that deploy strategies such as analogising and mental simulation to facilitate 
design progress. We return later to consider the important role played by uncertainty in 
design, but we first examine the organisation of design activity from a global perspective in 
relation to its inherent problem/sub-problem structure and the way problems and sub-
problems are tackled to engender a final, integrated design solution.  
 
3.1 Breadth-first, depth-first and opportunistic design development  
 
The complexity of most design problems necessitates some form of ‘divide-and-conquer’ or 
‘problem reduction’ approach, whereby designers identify how the overarching problem can 
be split into relatively independent but nevertheless interlinked sub-problems that can be 
worked on so that an effective, integrated solution can be developed (e.g., Goel & Pirolli, 
1989, 1992). Pioneering studies in the 1980s presented a view of design as involving 
systematic, top-down, hierarchical problem reduction and solution development. For 
example, Jeffries et al.’s (1981) software-design study found that experts and novices tackled 
design tasks using a top-down, problem-reduction approach that entailed the modular 
development of the program from abstract design levels through levels of increasing detail. 
Jeffries et al. noted, however, that the experts’ schedule for tackling sub-problems was 
predominantly ‘breadth-first’, whereas the novices’ schedule was predominantly ‘depth-first’.  
 
A breadth-first strategy has two key characteristics (Ball & Ormerod, 1995). First, the 
overarching design problem is reduced to several sub-problems relating to specific design 
goals. Second, these sub-problems are tackled a full level at a time, potentially producing 
sub-sub-problems whose development is postponed until all sub-sub-problems at that new 
level have been identified. This design approach is ‘balanced’ (Adelson & Soloway, 1986) in 
that the whole solution to the overarching design problem develops in an integrated manner 
through each level of abstraction. In contrast, the depth-first strategy entails taking one top-
level sub-problem at a time and developing it in detail before then moving onto do the same 
with each of the remaining top-level sub-problems in turn (Ball & Ormerod, 1995). This 
strategy is less effective than a breadth-first one because it requires costly backtracking if 
current solution ideas are incompatible with earlier ones. Nevertheless, the depth-first 
strategy is advantageous for facilitating early resolution of whole branches of the 
problem/sub-problem tree. Indeed, a noteworthy observation from Jeffries et al.’s (1981) 
study was that some experts periodically deviated from a breadth-first strategy, with such 
deviations involving the in-depth development of a solution to meet a high-level sub-
problem, especially when this sub-problem was perceived to be complex, unfamiliar or 
important. Thus, while these experts were still operating in a top-down manner they were 
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mixing breadth-first and depth-first design strategies in a context-sensitive way that was 
flexible yet effective.  
 
In the early 1990s a new wave of research made contrasting claims to the view of design as a 
predominantly structured, top-down activity, with several authors proposing that both novice 
and expert designers are highly unstructured. For example, Guindon (1990) noted that the 
software engineers she studied exhibited 53% of activities that deviated from top-down, 
breadth-first design. Visser (1990) claimed that while the expert designer she studied 
described himself as ‘intending’ to pursue a top-down, depth-first strategy his behaviour 
revealed considerable deviation from a structured approach. Accordingly, solution-
development processes in design started to be described as ‘opportunistic’ to emphasise the 
way in which designers take immediate advantage of solution opportunities. However, not all 
studies in the 1990s supported this view. Ball and Ormerod (1995), Ball et al. (1994), Ball, 
Evans, Dennis, and Ormerod (1997) and Davies (1991) presented evidence showing that 
design may best be viewed as predominantly top-down and structured but with ‘opportunistic 
episodes’ arising to circumvent design impasses or knowledge deficits as well as to capitalise 
on emerging opportunities. The current consensus is that design involves an adaptive 
combination of both structured and opportunistic processing (cf. Visser, 1994, 2006). This 
adaptive and dynamic view of the organisation of design activity is fundamentally 
metacognitive in its emphasis as it acknowledges the way in which ongoing monitoring and 
control processes can trigger deviations from a structured approach, for example, when 
designers are faced with uncertainty.  
 
In line with an adaptive account of the organisation of design processing, Ball et al. (1997) 
suggested that although the preferred strategy of expert designers is a top-down, breadth-first 
one, designers will typically switch to depth-first design to deal strategically with situations 
where their knowledge is stretched. Depth-first design is, therefore, a response to factors such 
as problem complexity and design uncertainty, with detailed exploration of solution ideas 
allowing designers to assess and gain confidence in the viability of uncertain concepts. This 
account was supported by Ball et al.’s (2010) study of software design teams, which revealed 
that designers produced an initial ‘first-pass’ solution to the given design brief in a breadth-
first manner, with this solution addressing several ‘easy-to-handle’ requirements. The 
designers then focused on adding ‘complex-to-handle’ requirements to this initial solution, 
which were also linked to heightened feelings of uncertainty. They then developed solutions 
to these complex requirements in a depth-first manner.  
 
3.2 Metacognitive monitoring and control in design and the role of uncertainty  
 
Considerations relating to the global organisation of cognitive processing in design bring 
metacognition to centre stage given its role in orchestrating the moment-by-moment 
monitoring and control of strategic processing. A metacognitive view of design aligns closely  
with Schön’s (1983) insights relating to the way in which design involves ‘reflective 
practice’, whereby expert designers exhibit a ‘a kind of knowing-in-practice’. Such 
knowledge is largely tacit, implicit and intuitive and therefore different to explicit, 
conventionalised knowledge of design rules and tactics as found in textbooks describing 
design methods. In advancing his theoretical framework of reflective practice, Schön (1983) 
also identified another key process of ‘reflection-in-action’, which he viewed as the 
‘intelligence’ that guides intuitive behaviour in contexts such as real-world design.  
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Schön’s notion of reflection-in-action has clear resonances with the concept of metacognition 
as captured in the ‘metareasoning framework’ espoused by Ackerman and Thompson (2017, 
2018). According to this model, metacognitive monitoring and control processes in thinking 
and reasoning are highly attuned to subjective feelings of certainty/uncertainty, including so-
called ‘judgments of solvability’ (i.e., estimates of the probability of successfully finding a 
solution to a problem), ‘feelings of warmth’ or ‘intermediate confidence’ (i.e., beliefs that 
one is on the right track toward an effective solution concept), ‘feelings of rightness’ (i.e., 
beliefs that a solution is effective or needs further development) and ‘final judgments of 
solvability’ or ‘final confidence’ (i.e., the sense that a problem has been solved successfully). 
We contend that Ackerman and Thompson’s metareasoning framework is highly relevant to 
understanding the evidence that we have reviewed on the nature of cognitive strategies in 
design, whether these relate to problem understanding, idea generation or solution evaluation. 
Indeed, much of the evidence discussed places designers’ subjective assessments of 
uncertainty at the very heart of their decision making relating to the deployment of strategies 
such as analogical reasoning, mental simulation or depth-first design development.   
 
In advancing a metacognitive understanding of design, we propose that a designer’s 
experience of heightened subjective uncertainty can act as a ‘metacognitive trigger’ to 
catalyse a change to a more elaborate and deliberative reasoning strategy than arises when 
they feel confident about ongoing processing. Analogising and mental simulation are two 
strategies that can be viewed as involving more elaborate and deliberative reasoning. Similar 
ideas have been proposed by Stempfle and Badke-Schaub (2002) in relation to a study of 
design-team thinking that coded for expressions of uncertainty. Their findings suggested that 
simpler design problems were associated with team self-efficacy and rapid, intuitive 
evaluative reasoning, whereas complex design problems triggered a shift towards a process of 
effortful idea generation and analysis. In other research, Paletz, Chan, and Schunn (2017) 
showed how uncertainty in design teams often triggers ‘micro-conflicts’ that involve effortful 
and deliberative ‘oppositional’ or argumentative reasoning between team members. 
Interestingly, such micro-conflicts were followed by reduced uncertainty in successful design 
teams but led to increased uncertainty in unsuccessful teams. 
 
We also propose that subjective uncertainty in design is constantly fluctuating, such that at 
one moment designers may feel confident in their progress, whilst at another moment they 
may hit an impasse or lose faith in the viability of an emerging idea. In this way, design 
cognition can alternate between periods of stable strategy deployment and sudden strategy 
change triggered by momentarily increased uncertainty. The idea of fluctuating feelings of 
uncertainty driving a metacognitive ‘switch’ mechanism is gaining widespread acceptance in 
reasoning research (e.g., Ackerman & Thompson 2014; Ball & Stupple 2016; Thompson, 
Prowse Turner, & Pennycook 2011; Thompson et al. 2013). Related ideas have also been 
advanced within entrepreneurship research in terms of understanding how individuals 
identify entrepreneurial opportunities and act upon them flexibly (McMullen & Shepherd, 
2006). In this regard, an ‘entrepreneurial mindset’ has been defined as the ability to be 
adaptive, flexible, and self-regulating in one's cognitive-strategy application given dynamic 
and uncertain task environments (Haynie, Shepherd, Mosakowski, & Earley, 2010). 
Differences in performance on entrepreneurial tasks may thus partly be explained by the role 
that metacognition plays in promoting cognitive adaptability. 
 
It is also becoming clear that strategic decisions that are based on metacognitive experiences 
are often determined by relative rather than absolute perceptions of perceived uncertainty 
(Wänke & Hansen 2015), with dynamic shifts between perceived certainty and perceived 
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uncertainty being critical for triggering strategy change. These ideas align with Christensen 
and Ball’s (2018) claim that in some design contexts epistemic uncertainty may fluctuate 
extensively, with periodic bouts of uncertainty leading to immediate, creative processing, 
whereas in other design contexts epistemic uncertainty may provide a more global and stable 
backdrop to ongoing activity, potentially leading to isolated moments of certainty triggering 
creative processing. This more nuanced account of metacognitive effects in design seems to 
be needed to explain some unexpected effects observed by Christensen and Ball (2018) in a 
study of collaborating designers tackling a complex, cross-cultural design task, where 
subjective ‘certainty’ rather than uncertainty was associated with immediate creative 
reasoning and information elaboration, although, as expected, subjective uncertainty 
predicted subsequent returns to unresolved issues.  
 
4 Prospects for research on design cognition and design metacognition 
 
Our review of the status of research on design cognition and design metacognition, although 
selective and at times inconsistent, nevertheless provides a valuable snapshot of our 
contemporary understanding of information processing in design. The inconsistency that 
arises is unsurprising given the multiplicity of factors that can impact upon design cognition, 
including differences in the background experience and expertise of designers, differences in 
whether studies are examining individual or collaborative design, differences in design 
domains and the nature and complexity of the tasks being tackled, differences in the 
methodologies adopted to study design cognition in the first place and differences in a whole 
host of other variables such as the presence of prior examples and analogies or the 
engagement of clients and stakeholders. Indeed, given the many, often uncontrolled factors 
that can permeate studies of design cognition, it is, perhaps, the overall consistency in 
findings that is most remarkable, hinting at the possibility that design is underpinned by a set 
of core processes, including ones we have highlighted such as conjecture-based problem 
formulation, problem–solution co-evolution, analogical reasoning, mental simulation and 
targeted solution generation.  
 
With respect to research on the fixating or inspiring effects of prior examples and analogies 
on creative design, the extant evidence suggests a positive view, whereby fixation may be of 
benefit to design ideation, especially when single examples are presented that are 
‘uncommon’ and from remote domains such that they encourage designers to explore a novel 
solution space in depth. As studies of fixation and inspiration in design progress it would be 
valuable to see greater methodological consistency (cf. Crilly, 2019b; Vasconcelos & Crilly, 
2016). In addition, we concur with Crilly’s (2019a) plea for more systematic case studies of 
real-world design that are targeted at exploring the nature of inspiration and fixation effects in 
individual and team-based design practice. Such case studies are a vital aspect of a multi-
method research endeavour in which ecological validity is essential to corroborate or 
challenge findings emerging from laboratory-based, experimental studies.    
 
A further, consistent observation emerging from our review relates to the role of subjective 
uncertainty as a trigger for metacognitive control processes to switch ongoing processing in 
new directions through the application of strategies such as analogising, mental simulation 
and depth-first idea exploration. We contend that metacognition has been an overlooked 
aspect of information processing in design, despite being central to understanding every 
aspect of a designer’s ongoing activity in progressing from an initial ill-defined design 
problem to an all-encompassing design solution. We argue that viewing design cognition 
through a metacognitive lens is critical to advancing an integrated understanding of the way 
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in which strategies change over the design timecourse in response to fluctuating feelings of 
uncertainty. That said, understanding the metacognitive basis of the dynamic aspects of 
design cognition is in its infancy, with many core questions still needing to be addressed. For 
example, it is unclear how best to measure subjective uncertainty in design. The analysis of 
‘hedge words’ in think-aloud protocols or design conversations is compelling but suffers 
from the occurrence of such terms as simple ‘politeness markers’, which can be difficult to 
spot and remove. An alternative approach would be to solicit ‘feeling of warmth’ or 
‘confidence’ ratings continuously during design activity, but this could be invasive and 
reactive, changing ‘natural’ design activity.  
 
Other challenges for developing a metacognitive understanding of design relate to issues 
discussed by Christensen and Ball (2018), whereby it can be hard to predict whether it is 
subjective uncertainty or subjective certainty that will drive design strategies as well as 
creative idea generation. To have a predictive model of the way in which certainty or 
uncertainty trigger design strategies is a goal that we are a long way from attaining, although 
it is clear that such a model will need to be attuned to the fact that uncertainty is a ‘relative’ 
state that can only be measured in terms of a prevailing background context. These various 
challenges to developing a metacognitive understanding of design are not insurmountable and 
overcoming them is, we believe, critical for achieving a fully encompassing account of 
design cognition. We welcome the fact that other design researchers are likewise recognising 
the importance of studying the metacognitive basis of design activity, and we note, for 
example, the recent work of Cash and Kreye (2018) who have investigated ‘uncertainty 
perception’ as a general driver for design activity through an observation-based protocol 
study. As in our research, Cash and Kreye view design as a process whereby uncertainty 
triggers activity that thence serves to resolve this uncertainty over time (see also Yu, Honda, 
Sharqawy, & Yang, 2016).  
 
We finally note that the selective nature of our review means that we have failed to cover 
some important aspects of design cognition, one of which is the core role played by sketching 
in problem understanding and idea generation (e.g., Goel, 1995; Goldschmidt, 1991; 
McGown, Green, & Rodgers,1998; Schön & Wiggins, 1992). We see sketching as a key area 
of design cognition that would benefit from in-depth studies of its metacognitive dimensions. 
Indeed, we note that preliminary research on this topic (Kavakli, Scrivener, & Ball, 1998; 
Scrivener, Ball, & Tseng, 2000) demonstrated how uncertainty is a trigger for strategic 
switches in designers’ modes of sketching, engendering transitions from structurally-oriented 
sketching (e.g., depicting design elements) to functionally-oriented sketching (e.g., reflecting 
the connectivity between elements and their integrated behaviour).  
 
We acknowledge that our review likely suffers from other omissions, many of which will 
have arisen inadvertently because of the sheer expansion in design-cognition research since 
the 1960s. The seemingly exponential growth in cognitively-oriented design research over the 
past few decades is certainly a positive development, although one that also brings challenges 
in terms of conceptual fragmentation. We therefore conclude with a call for greater efforts 
toward integrative, theory-driven research on design cognition (cf. Cash, 2018), which can 
itself be facilitated by contemporary reviews that identify common findings and general 
principles. We trust that the present review is a useful step in this direction, particularly with 
its focus on proposing a generic account of how strategic shifts in design processing may be 
based on metacognitive control decisions driven by designers’ fluctuating feelings of 
uncertainty. 
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